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TIMING IS PARAMOUNT: THE IMPACT OF
PARAMOUNT V. TIME ON THE LAW OF HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS
PAUL E. BURNS*
I. INTRODUCTION
0 N March 9, 1990, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed
Chancellor William T. Allen's decision to decline to enjoin the
well-publicized union of Time Inc. (Time) and Warner Communica-
tion, Inc. (Warner), a union which the Board of Directors of Time
had pursued despite the formidable assault mounted by Paramount
Communications, Inc. (Paramount).' This Article will examine how
the Paramount case has impacted the law of hostile takeovers by: (i)
affirming a target board's right to reject a hostile bid in order to facil-
itate the completion of a transaction planned before the announce-
ment of the bid; (ii) establishing that directors have the power to
choose a time frame for achievement of corporate goals, provided
they have developed a deliberately conceived plan; (ii) recognizing
that all-cash, all-shares offers can pose threats other than inadequacy
of price; (iv) reaffirming the need for a majority of outside, independ-
ent directors; and (v) permitting target boards to incur "heavy debt"
in order to effectuate the alternative, preplanned transaction.
The Article will begin by examining the Paramount case in detail. It
will then survey the pre-existing case law, with primary emphasis on
the development of the enhanced business judgment rule developed in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 2 During the course of this exam-
ination, the Article will discuss how post-Unocal decisions seemingly
foreshadowed the Paramount decision by emphasizing the importance
of the timing of the target board's proposed alternative action relative
to the hostile bid, i.e., that board actions planned or implemented be-
fore the hostile offer are more worthy of protection than post-tender
actions. Finally, the Article will analyze how the Paramount decision
* Principal, Trager & Trager P.C., Fairfield, Connecticut; B.S., 1981, Boston College;
J.D., 1984, Boston College Law School.
1. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
2. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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has impacted the enhanced business judgment rule and the law of hos-
tile takeovers.
II. PARAMOUNT V. TmE
A. The Facts
Time has long been one of the world's leading publishers of books
and magazines.3 Time also plays a major role in the cable television
industry through its ownership of Home Box Office, Inc., Cinemax,
and numerous cable TV franchises. 4 In 1987 Time established a special
committee to propose long-term corporate strategies for the 1990s.5
The committee decided that Time should acquire a foothold in the
video production business to complement its cable TV enterprises and
to position it favorably for the global economy of the 1990s. 6 Several
of Time's outside directors expressed concern that a foray into video
production might threaten "Time Culture" and its policies of edito-
rial integrity and journalistic focus.7 Notwithstanding this apprehen-
sion, the board decided to explore various means to implement the
special committee's recommendation."
Throughout 1987 and the first half of 1988, Time's Board consid-
ered various alternatives.9 Finally, in July 1988, the Board concluded
that a merger with Warner was the best course of action to pursue. 0
Negotiations between the two companies continued in the months fol-
lowing, but they broke down in late fall due to seemingly irreconcila-
3. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1143.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. These directors believed that Time was "an institution built upon a foundation of
journalistic integrity." Id. at 1143 n.4. It was feared that entry into the entertainment business
would shift Time's focus away from news journalism and editorial independence and thus jeop-
ardize the "Time Culture." Id.
8. Id. at 1144.
9. Id. The alternatives under consideration included merging with such entertainment gi-
ants as Warner Brothers, Paramount, Columbia, M.C.A., Fox, MGM, Disney, and Orion. Id.
10. Id. A consolidation with Warner carried with it a number of advantages. Warner had
just acquired Lorimar Productions and its film studios, thus enabling the Time-Warner combi-
nation to produce its own movies and television shows for broadcast on HBO. Warner also had
an international film and video distribution system that could be used to sell films, videos,
books, and magazines. In addition, Warner was a major player in the music and recording busi-
ness, an area into which Time wanted to expand. Moreover, Warner's cable system and publish-
ing company could be easily integrated with Time's. Id. at 1144-45.
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ble differences between the parties." Discussions resumed in January
1989 after Warner indicated its willingness to allow Time to control
CEO succession. 2 Although Time had favored an all-cash or cash-
plus securities acquisition of Warner, Time ultimately acceded to
Warner's request for a stock-for-stock deal. 13 Finally, in March 1989,
the Boards of Time and Warner approved the merger. 4
New York Stock Exchange rules required approval by Time's stock-
holders before its shares could be issued to effectuate the merger. 5 In
addition, Delaware law provided that a majority of Warner stock-
holders must assent to the merger. 6 The Time Board scheduled its
stockholder vote for June 23, 1989.17
Just two weeks before the scheduled vote, Paramount announced
an all-cash offer to purchase all outstanding shares of Time for $175
per share. 8 Although Paramount claimed that the offer was "fully
negotiable," it was in fact subject to three conditions. 9 First, Time
11. Id. at 1145. Motivated by its desire to preserve the Time Culture, Time insisted on
dominating the corporate governance of the merged enterprise. Warner, on the other hand,
feared that this would create the unwanted perception that Warner was "selling out to Time."
Id. When talks ceased, Time held informal discussions with other companies, including Para-
mount. Throughout these discussions, Time maintained that it was not putting itself up for sale.
Accordingly, Time terminated discussions with companies that proposed to purchase Time or to
control management of the proposed combination. Id.
12. Id. Time had proposed that Steve Ross, Warner's CEO, would act as co-CEO of the
new enterprise along with Time's CEO, N.J. Nicholas, but that Ross would retire after five years
leaving Nicholas as the sole CEO. Ross initially rejected this proposal as indicating a lack of
confidence in his leadership. Interestingly, Ross reconsidered after a private dinner with Michael
Dingman, one of Time's outside directors, at which Dingman convinced Ross that the proposal
did not reflect a lack of trust in Ross. Id.
13. Id. at 1145-46. In deciding upon a stock exchange ratio, Time's Board recognized the
need to pay Warner a premium in exchange for controlling corporate governance. Accordingly,
although the market exchange ratio of Time stock for Warner stock was .38 in favor of Warner,
Time agreed to an exchange rate of .465. This ratio would result in Warner stockholders owning
62% of the stock of the merged company. Id. at 1146.
14. Id. The parties agreed that a Time subsidiary would merge with Warner, and Warner
would be the surviving corporation. Warner's common stock would be exchanged for Time com-
mon stock at the agreed-upon exchange ratio. Thereafter, Time would change its name to Time-
Warner, Inc. The resulting company would have a 24-member board, with equal representation
for both companies. For the first five years the company would have co-CEOs, after which time
Warner's Ross would retire and Time's Nicholas would continue as the sole CEO. A two-thirds
supermajority vote would be required to alter CEO successions. In addition, the board would
create an editorial committee dominated by Time directors and an entertainment committee con-
trolled by Warner directors. Time also agreed to a "no-shop" clause, which prevented Time
from considering any other merger candidate. Id. at 1146-47.
15. Id. at 1146.
16. Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1988).
17. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1147. One month before the vote, Time sent out extensive
proxy statements urging stockholders to vote in favor of the merger. Id.
18. Id. On June 7, 1989, the date of the tender offer, Time's stock was trading at $126. On
the following day, the market price rose to $170. Id.
19. Id.
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had to terminate the merger agreement with Warner. Second, Time
was required to transfer ownership of certain cable franchises to Para-
mount. Finally, a judicial determination that the Delaware anti-
takeover statute was inapplicable to a Paramount-Time merger would
have to be obtained. 2
Time's Board unequivocally rejected Paramount's offer as inade-
quate and steadfastly maintained that the Warner combination of-
fered Time the greatest benefits. 21 Notwithstanding previous
widespread stockholder support for the Warner merger, the Board
was concerned that it might be unable to dissuade its stockholders
from accepting Paramount's tempting offer.? Consequently, the
Board decided to restructure the transaction as an outright acquisition
of Warner that would not require shareholder approval.2 In order to
obtain Warner's assent, Time had to agree to abide by the original
corporate governance provisions and to be legally bound to complete
the transaction unless enjoined.24
On June 23, 1989, Paramount raised its offer to $200 per share. 2
Three days later Time's Board rejected the bid, insisting that the
Warner deal offered stockholders greater long-term value and the
preservation of "Time Culture." 26 Paramount then commenced an ac-
tion in the Delaware Court of Chancery seeking to enjoin Time's ac-
quisition of Warner.27 Chancellor Allen refused to enjoin the Time-
Warner transaction.28 Ten days later, on July 24, 1989, the Supreme
Court of Delaware orally affirmed the Chancellor's decision,29 but it
did not issue its final written opinion until March 9, 1990.30
Although the supreme court's written opinion reaffirmed Chancel-
lor Allen's decision, its reasoning and analysis differ from the Chan-
20. Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
21. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1148. Time's Board was convinced that the Paramount offer
directly threatened "Time's control of its own destiny and retention of the 'Time Culture."' Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The restructured deal was a two-tiered transaction in which Time would purchase
51% of Warner stock for $70 per share in cash and the remaining 49% for cash and securities
valued at $70 per share. At the time of the decision it was estimated that Time would have to
incur $7 to $10 billion dollars in debt. Id. The actual amount of debt that Time incurred turned
out to be approximately $10.8 billion. See Susan Duffy, Time Warner: Debt Burden? No Prob-
lem, Busnmss WEEK, Oct. 22, 1990, at 82.
24. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1148.
25. Id. at 1149.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1141-42; Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,264 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1990).
28. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,284.
29. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1140.
30. Id.
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cellor's in several material respects. This Article focuses exclusively on
the supreme court's decision, with appropriate references to the chan-
cery court decision where necessary to facilitate greater understanding
of the supreme court's decision.
B. The Inapplicability of Revlon
The first issue considered by the supreme court was whether the
Time-Warner agreement was tantamount to putting Time up for sale,
thus invoking auctioneer duties under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings.31 In Revlon, the court ruled that once it appears that
the break-up of a company is inevitable, "[tihe directors' role
change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company. ' 32 The Paramount plaintiffs argued that Revlon was trig-
gered because: (i) the original Time-Warner stock-swap deal resulted
in Warner shareholders' owning sixty-two percent of the new com-
pany, and (ii) the Time directors adopted various defensive measures
to assuage their concern that Time might be viewed as being up for
sale.33 The plaintiffs further claimed that in cloaking the Time-Warner
transaction with antitakeover armor, Time triggered Revlon duties by
effectively precluding its shareholders from obtaining a control pre-
mium. 34
The supreme court identified two circumstances that activate Rev-
lon duties. The first is when a corporation initiates a sale of itself ei-
ther as a going concern or with the understanding that a breakup will
result. 35 The second is when a company reacts to a takeover threat by
abandoning its long-term strategy and soliciting an alternative bid that
anticipates the breakup of the company. 36 Under these circumstances,
'.[t]he duty of the board [has] changed from the preservation of...
[the] corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a
31. Id. at 1149; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
32. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
33. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1149. The record indicates that some Board members were
concerned that the Time-Warner negotiations might be perceived as putting Time "in play."
This concern prompted discussions regarding whether the Board should adopt further anti-
takeover measures in addition to the substantial provisions already in place. Id. at 1144 & n.5.
Ultimately, when the board approved the stock swap, it implemented additional defensive meas-
ures, including an automatic share-exchange agreement with Warner, acquisition of assurances
that certain lenders would not finance any attempt to acquire Time, and a "no-shop" provision
that precluded Time from considering any other consolidation proposal. Id. at 1146.
34. Id. at 1149.
35. Id. at 1150; see, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del.
1989).
36. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150; see, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989).
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sale for the stockholders' benefit .... ,,,37 If, on the other hand, the
board defends a hostile takeover bid in order to protect the corpora-
tion's continued existence, Revlon duties do not attach.38
The court of chancery based its denial of the plaintiffs' Revlon
claim on the fact that the original Time-Warner stock swap transac-
tion would not have resulted in any change of control.39 The supreme
court, however, premised its rejection of the Revlon argument on the
lack of any evidence showing that Time's board made the dissolution
or breakup of Time inevitable by negotiating with Warner. 40 The su-
preme court further ruled that the alleged subjective intent of Time's
board as manifested by expressions of concern that the Warner deal
might be perceived by the market as putting Time up for sale "is en-
tirely insufficient to invoke Revlon duties .... ",41 Moreover, the su-
preme court adopted the Chancellor's holding that the validity of
defensive measures and the forbearance of a substantial control pre-
mium are properly subject to a Unocal analysis and do not, in and of
themselves, trigger Revlon duties. 42
C. The Unocal Analysis
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,43 the supreme court held
that in evaluating whether the business judgment rule should be in-
37. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150 n.13 (alteration in original) (quoting Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)).
38. Id. at 1150-51.
39. Id. at 1150. This is an example of how the Chancellor made the right decision, but for
reasons different than those of the supreme court. The supreme court's test for determining
whether Revlon duties attach is whether the breakup of the company is inevitable. Id. The Chan-
cellor's test was whether a change of control is contemplated. Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,264, 93,277 (Del.
Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). However, the Chancellor concluded that
no change of control would result even though Warner stockholders would own 62% of Time-
Warner stock. Id. at 93,279. Given that before the original merger agreement "control of the
corporation existed in a fluid aggregation of unaffillated shareholders representing a voting ma-
jority-in other words, in the market," control over Time "can be expected to remain unaf-
fected by a stock for stock merger." Id.
The Chancellor also rejected the plaintiffs' control premium argument on the grounds that: (i)
the Time-Warner transaction did not preclude the possibility of Time-Warner shareholders re-
ceiving a future control premium, and (ii) the propriety of a board's decision to forgo acceptance
of a takeover bid containing a control premium is more appropriately addressed under a Unocal
analysis. Id. at 93,280-81; see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
40. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150.
41. Id. at 1151; see Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35
(Del. 1989); see generally Lyman Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus.
LAw. 2105, 2110-12 (1990).
42. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1151. The court also noted that a future acquisition of the
Time-Warner combination might be possible, thus leaving open the possibility of receiving a
future control premium. Id.
43. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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voked to protect a board's defensive response to a hostile takeover,
the board has the burden of proving: (i) that it had reasonable
grounds for believing that the takeover bid posed a threat to corporate
policy and effectiveness and (ii) that the defensive measure adopted
was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.4
1. Reasonableness of Believing That a Threat to Corporate Policy
and Effectiveness Existed
The court in Paramount rejected the plaintiffs' contention that in-
adequate value was the only possible "threat" posed by an all-cash,
all-shares offer.45 This contention "represents a fundamental miscon-
ception of our standard of review under Unocal principally because it
would involve the court in substituting its judgment as to what is a
'better' deal for that of a corporation's board of directors."46 The
court reaffirmed its holding in Unocal that, in addition to inadequate
value, appropriate considerations in evaluating takeover threats in-
clude the 'nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the
impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders, ... the risk of
nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the
exchange."'4
44. Id. at 955; Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152. In Unocal, the court explained:
mhe business judgment rule, including the standards by which director conduct is
judged, is applicable in the context of a takeover. The business judgment rule is a
"presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company." A hallmark of the business judgment rule is that
a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter's decision can
be "attributed to any rational business purpose."
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to determine
whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In
that respect a board's duty is no different from any other responsibility it shoulders,
and its decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be
accorded in the realm of business judgment. There are, however, certain caveats to a
proper exercise of this function. Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may
be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the
threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted); see infra pt. III.B.
45. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153.
46. Id.
47. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). The court observed that
the open-ended analysis mandated by Unocal is not intended to lead to a simple mathematical
comparison of the discounted value of Time-Warner's expected trading price at some future date
with Paramount's present offer. Id. "[The] precepts underlying the business judgment rule mili-
tate against a court's engaging in the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the relative
merits of a long-term versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders." Id.
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Applying this standard to the Paramount bid, the court found that
the Time Board reasonably believed that, in addition to inadequate
value, the tender offer posed other threats, such as: (1) the likelihood
that shareholders might tender their shares in ignorance of the strate-
gic benefits afforded by the Time-Warner merger, (2) the degree of
uncertainty resulting from the conditions placed on the offer, and (3)
the fact that the timing of the offer was designed to upset the origi-
nally scheduled shareholder vote on the Time-Warner merger for the
purpose of confusing the shareholders." In addition, the court ruled
that the Time Board's previous investigation of possible merger candi-
dates, including Paramount, provided the Board with sufficient infor-
mation to enable it to make an informed decision concerning the
threats posed by the Paramount offer-the Board was under no obli-
gation to reconsider Paramount after having previously rejected it.49
"Given this record evidence, we cannot conclude that the Time
Board's decision.., that Paramount's offer posed a threat to corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness was lacking in good faith or dominated
by motives of either entrenchment or self-interest. ' 50 The court's con-
clusion was influenced in part by the fact that twelve of the sixteen
board members were outside independent directors.
51
2. Reasonableness of the Defensive Action
In determining whether the defensive measures were reasonably re-
lated to the threats posed, the court evaluated I"the importance of the
corporate objective threatened; alternative methods of protecting that
objective; impacts of the 'defensive' action, and other relevant fac-
tors.' ' 5 2 In rejecting Paramount's claim that Time's response was un-
reasonable, the court held that the directors' duty to manage the
corporation "includes the selection of a time frame for achievement
of corporate goals." ' 53 "That duty," the court ruled, "may not be del-
egated to the stockholders. ' 54 Consequently, the court concluded,
"[d]irectors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived cor-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1153-54.
50. Id. at 1153.
51. Id. at 1154; see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985);
Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
52. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990).
53. Id.; see infra pt. III.B.
54. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154.
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porate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy." 55
Even in the face of a valid threat, if the board's actions are coercive
or "force upon shareholders a management-sponsored alternative to a
hostile offer," they may be struck down as unreasonable responses.5 6
The supreme court found that the Time Board's action was not aimed
at forcing shareholders to accept management's alternative, but it was
designed to consummate a transaction that had been adopted before
the Paramount bid.57 Moreover, the court found that the revised
Time-Warner transaction did not preclude Paramount from making a
future offer for the combined company.58 Thus, the court concluded
that the Time Board's action was reasonably related and proportion-
ate to the threat posed. Consequently, having determined that Revlon
was inapplicable and that the Unocal test was met, the court affirmed
the Chancellor's refusal to enjoin the Time-Warner transaction. 9
III. THE LAW BEFORE PARAMOUNT V. TME
In order to understand fully the impact of Paramount v. Time on
the law of hostile takeovers, an examination of prior case law is war-
ranted. After a brief review of Revlon, this Article will analyze Uno-
cal and the cases decided during the subsequent half-decade before
Paramount v. Time. The analysis will endeavor to chart the develop-
ment of Unocal's enhanced business judgment rule and to show how
the Delaware courts had become increasingly influenced by the timing
of board action in their determination of whether the action passed
muster under Unocal. The analysis will also demonstrate the chancery
55. Id. Paramount argued that the Time Board failed the "reasonable relationship" prong
of the Unocal test because its action precluded shareholders from receiving a control premium.
The court rejected this argument, declaring that the board has the power to decide if and when
shareholders should receive a control premium. Shareholders do not have an absolute right to a
control premium. Id.; see Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at 2109.
56. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154; see Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261 (Del. 1989); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch.
1986).
57. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154-55 & n.19; see Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp.,
559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989).
58. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1155.
59. Id. The court was unmoved by the fact that Time was required to incur a "heavy debt"
to finance its acquisition of Warner. Id. That fact alone, said the court, "does not render the
Board's decision unreasonable so long as the directors could reasonably perceive the debt load
not to be so injurious to the corporation as to jeopardize its well being." Id. But see Duffy,
supra note 23, at 82, where Business Week reports that 15 months after the Time-Warner trans-
action, stockholders were concerned that the $10.8 billion of debt incurred by Time was ad-
versely affecting the value of the company's stock which, at the time of the article, was trading
at approximately $70 per share, $130 less than Paramount's highest offer.
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court's propensity to scrutinize board actions more closely than the
supreme court's policy of judicial restraint would ultimately allow. 60
A. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings and the Duty to
Auction
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 1 the Delaware
Supreme Court fashioned a rule that has become a doctrinal pillar of
Delaware corporation law. The "Revlon principle" provides that
when the breakup of the company becomes inevitable in the context
of a takeover bid, the duty of the board changes from the preserva-
tion of the corporate entity to the maximization of the company's
value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit.62
As the Revlon Board painfully learned, the duty of auctioneer car-
ries with it certain obligations. Once the corporation has been placed
in the "Revlon mode," the board may not favor one bidder over an-
other.613 In addition, the board must place shareholders' interests be-
fore all other "constituencies" when an auction among active bidders
is in progress. 4 The Revlon Board's failure to adhere to these princi-
60. See, e.g., City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Grand
Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
61. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
62. Id. at 182; Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 68 (Del.
1989); see Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284-85 (Del. 1988); see
generally Ronald J. Rinaldi, Note, Radically Altered States: Entering the "Revlon Zone," 90
CoLuM. L. Rav. 760 (1990).
63. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. As the court explained:
Favoritism for a white knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be justifi-
able when the latter's offer adversely affects shareholder interests, but when bidders
make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the
directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the con-
tending factions. Market forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target's
shareholders the best price available for their equity.
Id.; see also Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261.
In Macmillan, the supreme court enjoined a lockup agreement between Macmillan and "white
knight" Kolberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) after Macmillan's Board gave KKR an unfair advantage
over plaintiffs in an auction for control of Macmillan. Id. at 1264. The court ruled that the
transaction failed to pass the "intrinsic fairness" test set forth in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983). Id. at 1265. The court applied the intrinsic fairness test because the
court found that some of the directors had a personal interest in seeing KKR prevail in the
auction. Id. at 1265, 1279-80.
Although Macmillan is cited here as an example of a case in which the board improperly
favored one bidder over another, it is instructive to examine the Macmillan court's attempt to
bring Revlon within the conceptual penumbra of Unocal by declaring that a board will continue
to be judged by Unocal standards even when it enters the Revlon mode. Id. at 1287-88; see
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
64. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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ples led to the court's refusal to sustain the board's attempt to thwart
a hostile bid by Pantry Pride. 65
Although Paramount v. Time is more aptly classified as Unocal
progeny, an examination of Revlon is helpful to illustrate the limita-
tions on board action in the context of a hostile takeover. Once the
target corporation enters the Revlon mode, it becomes a certain casu-
alty in a bidding war with the spoils going to the highest bidder re-
gardless of whether that bidder is friendly to the target board.
Accordingly, the oft-used defensive tactic of searching for a "white
knight" can backfire when the "shark" is determined to outbid
friendly suitors." As the Paramount court explained, Revlon is in-
voked when the sale or breakup of the company becomes inevitable
either at the behest of the board or as a reaction to a hostile threat. 67
Consequently, target boards desiring to "defend the corporate bas-
tion" should avoid actions that will invoke the Revlon duty to auc-
tion."
B. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and the Enhanced Business
Judgment Rule
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.69 is the seminal case that cre-
ated the legal standard applicable to target boards' defensive actions.
In Unocal, Mesa Petroleum Company and other entities controlled by
reputed corporate raider T. Boone Pickens, Jr. initiated a two-tiered,
front-loaded hostile bid for Unocal Corporation. The "front end"
consisted of an offer to pay $54 per share in cash for 37% of Unocal's
65. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185. As a defensive tactic to Pantry Pride's hostile bid, the Revlon
Board issued its own offer to exchange Revlon stock for certain subordinated notes. Id. at 177.
After the board announced plans to permit Forstman Little & Co. to acquire Revlon via a lever-
aged buyout (with Revlon management's participation) and to waive certain note covenants, the
market value of the notes declined irrevocably. Id. at 178. Irate noteholders threatened to sue the
board. Id. Motivated by their fear of personal liability, the Revlon directors prematurely ended
the auction between Pantry Pride and Forstman by approving a Forstman bid that purported to
protect the noteholders by supporting the par value of the notes. Id. at 179. The court held that,
by preferring the noteholders at the expense of the shareholders, the directors breached their
duty of loyalty. Id. at 182. Moreover, by placing their own interests in avoiding personal liability
over the interests of shareholders, the directors could not withstand the enhanced scrutiny re-
quired by Unocal. Id. at 184.
66. See, e.g., Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261.
67. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); see, e.g.,
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989); Macmillan, 559 A.2d
1261. The Paramount court rejected the applicability of Revlon on the grounds that Time's ne-
gotiations with Warner did not make the breakup of Time inevitable. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 39-42.
68. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; see generally Barry Reder, The Obligation of a Director of a
Delaware Corporation to Act as an Auctioneer, 44 Bus. LAw. 275 (1989).
69. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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outstanding stock, while the "back end" provided for an exchange of
highly subordinated junk bonds purportedly worth $54 per share for
the remaining publicly held shares. 70 The Unocal Board unanimously
rejected the offer and proposed to initiate its own self-tender if Mesa
was successful in completing the front end of its offer.7 1 The Board
also resolved to preclude Mesa from participating in the self-tender.7 2
In response to this defensive action, Mesa convinced the court of
chancery to enjoin the board from excluding Mesa from the self-
tender,73 but the supreme court vacated the injunction.74
The supreme court took advantage of the opportunity presented by
the Unocal case to enunciate the principles governing directors' duties
when the directors are confronted with a hostile takeover bid.7 5 The
court began with the premises that directors have an obligation to de-
termine whether an offer is in the best interests of the corporation and
its shareholders, and that the board's decision on this issue "should
be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in
the realm of business judgment. ' 76 However, before the court will
confer the protections of the business judgment rule upon the board,
a threshold inquiry must be conducted. The court explained:
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred.
70. Id. at 949.
71. Id. at 950-51. The Board decided that upon Mesa's acquisition of 37% of Unocal stock,
Unocal would purchase the remaining 49% of outstanding shares for debt securities valued at
$72 per share. Id. at 951.
72. Id. To permit Mesa to participate in the self-tender would have defeated the Board's
objective to protect shareholders from the "back end" of the Mesa proposal because Unocal
would, in effect, be financing the Mesa offer and Mesa would receive majority control. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 959.
75. Arguably, the supreme court could have left for another day the proclamation of these
principles. The court could have simply decided the case on the narrow issue before it: whether it
was proper for the Board to deal selectively with its stockholders under the circumstances pre-
sented in the instant action. The court did set forth the "well established" rule that a corpora-
tion may deal selectively with its stockholders provided that the directors have not acted out of a
sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office. Id. at 954; see also Cheff v. Mathes,
199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 408 (Del. 1962); Martin v.
American Potash & Chem. Corp., 92 A.2d 295, 302 (Del. 1952). However, rather than simply
analyzing the facts to determine whether Unocal's Board met this test, the court went far beyond
that inquiry to set forth the "enhanced business judgment rule" for determining whether defen-
sive actions of target companies will be upheld. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
76. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
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In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock
ownership. [This burden is satisfied] by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation. Furthermore, such proof is materially
enhanced, as here, by the approval of a board comprised of a
majority of outside independent directors who have acted in
accordance with the foregoing standards.7 7
In addition to showing a reasonable belief that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed, the board must show that the defen-
sive action taken by it was "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed." 7 8 As the court further explained:
This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover
bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such
concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and
timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
"constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e. creditors, customers,
employees and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of
nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the
exchange .... [In addition], a board may reasonably consider the
basic stockholder interests at stake, including those of short term
speculators, whose actions may have fueled the coercive aspect of the
offer at the expense of the long term investor.7 9
After the board meets its burden of showing a reasonable belief that
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed and that its re-
sponse was reasonable in relation to the threat posed, the business
judgment rule applies to the board's action.80 Once the business judg-
ment rule attaches, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the board in the absence of evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty.,
Applying these principles to the case before it, the Unocal court found
77. Id. at 954-55 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 955.
79. Id. at 955-56.
80. Id. at 958.
81. Id. The court lends support to its application of the business judgment rule (as modified
by Unocal) to target boards' defensive actions by citing an empirical study that showed that
stockholders benefited from successful defenses of hostile takeovers in a majority of the cases
from 1973 to 1982, as evidenced by higher subsequent offers or by stock price increases. Id. at
956 n. 11 (citing Martin Lipton and Andrew R. Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors'
Responsibilities: An Update, 40 Bus. LAw 1403 (1985)). This raises the question of whether the
court would invoke a higher degree of scrutiny over defensive actions if a future study showed
contrary results.
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that the Unocal Board's selective self-tender offer, which discrimi-
nated against Mesa, was entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule.12 "If the stockholders are displeased with the action of
their elected representatives," said the court, "the powers of corpo-
rate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out." '83
Unocal illustrates the Supreme Court of Delaware's attempt to bal-
ance its reluctance to become a "supreme board of directors" that
would second guess every defensive action with the need to quell the
"omnipresent specter" of director self-interest8 Some commentators
have criticized the Delaware judiciary's policy of judicial restraint in
the hostile takeover arena as sanctioning self-interested defensive ac-
tions designed to entrench management at the expense of sharehold-
ers." Notwithstanding this criticism, the supreme court has wisely
82. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957-58. The court noted that the Board's decision effectively pro-
tected 49% of the shareholders who would otherwise have been forced to accept the inferior
junk bonds as part of the "back end" of the Mesa offer. Id. at 957.
83. Id. at 959; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
84. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at 2114 (noting the Delaware judiciary's "venera-
ble policy of judicial restraint").
85. See generally James F. Ritter, Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA.
L. REv. 850, 867, 876-77 (1986); Thomas C. Pelto, Sr., Note, False Halo: The Business Judg-
ment Rule in Corporate Control Contests, 66 TEx. L. Rnv. 843 (1988).
Professors Easterbrook, Fischel, and Schwartz have long maintained that target management
should passively refrain from taking any action to defend a hostile tender offer. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HA~v. L. Rnv. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter Proper Role];
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholder
Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733 (1981); see also Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices
in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1988); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the
Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 229 (1986). Professors Bebchuk, Coffee, Gilson,
and Oesterle have advocated what has been referred to as the "managerial auctioneer" ap-
proach-the argument that target boards should be able to resist a hostile bid only for the pur-
pose of obtaining a higher offer. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for
Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEGAL SwtD. 197 (1988); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers: A Last (?) Reply, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 253 (1986); Lucian A. Beb-
chuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HIAv. L.
R-v. 1695 (1985); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARv. L. Rav. 1028 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 SrA. L. Rav. 23 (1982); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain
Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay On Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis.
L. Rav. 435; John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate
Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1145 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Struc-
tural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson,
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN L. REv. 51
(1982); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1981); Dale A. Oesterle, The Negotiation Model
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resisted the temptation to interfere with corporate governance to the
extent suggested by its critics. The rationale for the court's policy of
restraint may be found in the underpinnings of the business judgment
rule itself. 6
When formulating a response to a hostile bid, target boards must
draw on their members' business acumen and knowledge of both the
corporation and the environment in which it operates. Target boards
must often rely on uncertain economic forecasts, financial projec-
tions, and estimates of value compiled and analyzed under the intense
pressure of a takeover battle. These data must be evaluated together
with corporate information not publicly available and with uncorro-
borated assumptions about the hostile suitor's intentions. While
courts routinely render judgments on highly complex and technical is-
sues with the assistance of expert testimony, neither judges nor experts
have the requisite business experience and insider knowledge necessary
to evaluate the propriety of the board's judgment where no breach of
fiduciary duty has occurred.8 7 Moreover, the substitution of the judg-
of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 ComRm. L. Rav. 117 (1986);
Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers As Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender
Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CoRELL L. Ray. 53 (1985).
For an excellent critical analysis of these theories, see Robert A. Prentice & John H. Lang-
more, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan Defense': May Target Boards "Just Say
No"? Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 377, 412-60 (1990), where the authors
argue that target boards should be permitted to "just say no" to hostile takeovers: (i) to protect
shareholders from coercive bids, (ii) to run an auction, (iii) to protect shareholders from inade-
quate bids, and (iv) in other special circumstances.
86. As one commentator has explained:
There are several rationales underlying the business judgment rule. First, the rule
reflects judicial acknowledgement that courts are ill-equipped to analyze business deci-
sions and substitute their own business judgment for that of directors. Second, the
rule recognizes that directors must be given room to take risks in order for the corpo-
ration to make a profit and should not be exposed to liability simply because the risks
taken later prove to be unfruitful. Third, the rule embodies the simple recognition that
nobody is perfect, including directors.... Therefore, directors who have acted in
good faith and in accordance with their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty should not
be held liable for decisions which turn out poorly or to the displeasure of stockhold-
ers. Finally, the rule considers the economic rationale that courts should not interfere
with directors' decisions, nor impose liability on directors, because market forces al-
ready provide a sufficient monitor of director efficiency.
Scott P. Towers, Comment, Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.-The Unocal Stan-
dard: More Bark Than Bite?, 15 D.. J. CORP. L. 483, 491-93 (1990); see also S. Samuel Arsht,
The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 93, 95 (1979); Kristin A. Linsley,
Comment, Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A New Look at Conflicts
of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON LEoas. 527, 534-35 (1987).
87. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch.
1986) ("IT]he business judgment rule... is, of course, simply a recognition of the allocation of
responsibility made by section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law and of the limited institu-
tional competence of courts to assess business decisions."); In re Curfew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R.
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ment of various judges for that of various boards would produce an
incongruous mosaic of case law that, over time, would assume anar-
chic proportions.
In sum, the court appropriately declined to implement an overly in-
trusive rule to regulate target boards' defensive actions, while at the
same time recognizing that the "omnipresent specter" requires some-
thing more than an ordinary business judgment rule analysis. 8 Conse-
quently, Unocal's "enhanced judicial scrutiny" was a logical
compromise between the court's reluctance to become a "super-
board" and the need to protect shareholders from board entrench-
ment.89
506, 511 (Utah 1981) ("The courtroom is not a boardroom. The judge is not a business consult-
ant."); see also Linsley, supra note 86, at 534-35. (citing Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Not only do businessmen know more about business than
judges do, but competition in the product and labor markets and in the market for corporate
control provides sufficient punishment for businessmen who commit more than their share of
business mistakes.")); Towers, supra note 86, at 492 n.41 ("Directors who are familiar with the
business of their corporation, who have experience in the business world, and who must often
make decisions in the heat of the moment, are in a better position to make corporate business
decisions than is a judge, who at best can attempt to exercise 20-20 hindsight.").
In his Paramount decision, Chancellor Allen observed that because directors have access to
information about the corporation's present and future condition that is not publicly available,
the efficient capital market hypothesis is rendered inoperative. Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,264 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). Accordingly, it is reasonable for directors to
believe that the market price of stock at any given time does not accurately reflect the true value
of the corporation. Id.; see Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at 2106-08. But see Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247, 259-64 (1989), where the authors dis-
cuss the problem of reconciling shareholder mistrust of directors with directors' expertise and
insider knowledge.
For an explanation of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, which has as its central tenet
that the market correctly values the worth of a company at any given time, see Robert Hamilton,
Coapo A- FNArNcE: CASES AND MATEiAms, 252-95 (West 2d ed. 1989). See also Proper Role,
supra note 85; Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1978) (efficient capital
markets hypothesis applicable to hostile takeovers); see generally Prentice & Langmore, supra
note 85, at 414-20; Cindi S. Ingram, Comment, An Overview and Economic Analysis of Tender
Offers and Management's Response to Takeover Threats, 54 Mo. L. REv. 953, 992-99 (1989).
88. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1144 (Del. 1990); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 87, at
266 ("The premise of an intermediate standard of review is that the courts must exercise inde-
pendent judgment in balancing the reasonable skepticism of shareholders (which considered
alone would suggest prohibiting preclusive tactics) against the presumptive expertise of managers
(which considered alone would suggest blanket business judgment protection of preclusive tac-
tics).").
89. See Gilbert, 575 A.2d at 1145 & n.29; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55.
While the enhanced business judgment rule represents a commendable attempt to adopt a
flexible compromise between board autonomy and shareholder protection, an analysis of its
structural components reveals that it contains "duplicate prongs." By way of illustration, the
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C. The Development of the Enhanced Business Judgment Rule and
the Emergence of Timing As a Determinative Factor in the Decision
of Whether Board Action Will Be Upheld
With the Unocal decision firmly in place, the Delaware courts were
prepared to meet the challenges presented by the merger-manic years
between 1985 and 1989. The unprecedented volume of takeover bat-
tles during this period would prove to be a formidable testing ground
for Unocal's enhanced business judgment rule.90 An examination of
the most significant hostile takeover decisions during the five years
following Unocal shows how the timing of the target board's action
relative to the hostile bid had become a determinative factor in the
decision to uphold or strike down the action. As the Delaware judici-
ary moved closer to the Paramount v. Time decision, the importance
structural components of the enhanced business judgment rule may be represented as follows:
A. The threshold examination:
1. The board must show that it had a reasonable belief that the tender offer posed a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, which may be satisfied by a showing
of:
(a) good faith; and
(b) reasonable investigation; [the proof of which is "materially enhanced" by the
fact that the board consists of a majority of outside directors].
2. The board must show that its defensive action was reasonable in relation to the
threat posed.
B. The business judgment rule:
I. If the threshold examination is satisfied, the business judgment rule applies.
2. Once the business judgment rule attaches, directors' actions are protected so long
as the actions are not primarily based upon perpetuating the directors in office
and as long as they have acted:
(a) in good faith;
(b) based on reasonable investigation;
(c) without overreaching; and
(d) in the absence of fraud.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55, 958. Consequently, if a board satisfies the first prong of "the
threshold examination" by showing good faith and reasonable investigation, it invariably satis-
fies the good faith and reasonable investigation elements of the traditional business judgment
rule.
The court's tolerance of this modicum of conceptual redundancy was probably motivated by
the customary judicial desire to avoid deviating from traditional legal principles. The court must
have believed that it was more beneficial to invoke the traditional business judgment rule with
appropriate modifications than to fashion a completely new rule that might have unwanted ram-
ifications beyond the realm of hostile takeovers.
90. See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989);
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985);
Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989); Robert M. Bass Group v.
Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049
(Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assoc. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acquisi-
tions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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of timing began to foreshadow the essential holdings expounded in
Paramount v. Time: (i) that board actions planned before the an-
nouncement of the offer appear to be more worthy of protection than
post-tender actions; and (ii) that boards have the power, and indeed
the duty, to choose a time frame for achievement of corporate goals,
provided they have formulated a "deliberately conceived plan" before
the announcement of the offer.
1. The Pre-Planned, Prophylactic Defensive Mechanism: Moran
v. Household International
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,91 Household's Board
adopted a prophylactic poison pill designed to discourage potential
hostile suitors. 92 A prospective tender offeror brought suit to enjoin
the implementation of the pill. In affirming the court of chancery's
refusal to enjoin the pill,93 the Delaware Supreme Court foreshadowed
the emerging importance of timing in determining whether board ac-
tion will be upheld. As the court stated:
[P]re-planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce
the risk that, under the pressure of a takeover bid, management will
fail to exercise reasonable judgment. Therefore, in reviewing a pre-
91. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
92. Id. at 1348-49. A recent definition of the term "poison pill" provides:
A "poison pill" is a plan providing for the below market value distribution to com-
mon stockholders of a corporation of either preferred stock or stock rights consisting
of redemption or conversion privileges. Its purpose is to deter hostile takeover offers
for the stock of a target corporation and its effect is to make the target's stock prohib-
itively expensive to the suitor.
In re DeSoto, Inc. Shareholder Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,964, 95,396 (Del. Ch. 1990); see also Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Note, An Examination of
Board of Directors' Duty to Redeem the Rights Issued Pursuant to a Stockholder Rights Plan,
14 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 537 (1989); David A. Rosenzweig, Note, Poison Pill Rights: Toward a Two-
Step Analysis of Directors' Fidelity to Their Fiduciary Duties, 56 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 373, 374-
75 (1988).
The poison pill adopted by Household's Board provided that Household common stockhold-
ers would get one "right" per share upon either of two triggering events: (i) the announcement
of a tender offer for 30% or more of Household's shares, or (ii) the acquisition of 20% of
Household's shares by any single entity or group. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348. If the 30% trigger
occurred, the rights were issued and were immediately exercisable to purchase 1/100 of a share
of new preferred stock for $100. In addition, the rights were redeemable by the board for $.50
per right. If the 20% trigger occurred, the rights were exercisable to purchase 1/100 of a share of
preferred stock, but the rights were not redeemable. The right also contained a "flip-over" pro-
vision which provided that if the right holder did not choose to acquire the preferred stock, the
right could be exercised to purchase $200 worth of common stock of the tender offeror for $100
if a subsequent merger or consolidation between Household and the tender offeror occurred.
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349.
93. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357; see also Moran v. Household Int'l, 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.
1985).
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planned defensive mechanism it seems even more appropriate to
apply the business judgment rule.94
From this passage, it may reasonably be inferred that the fact that
Household's defensive action came well before any prospective tender
offer was a substantial factor in the court's decision to uphold it. 95
The court admonished, however, that "[tihe ultimate response to an
actual takeover bid must be judged by the Directors' actions at that
time," and that nothing in the Moran opinion relieves the board of its
"basic fundamental duties to the corporation and its stockholders."96
In addition to providing the first post-Unocal illustration of the im-
portance of timing, Moran left its imprint on Unocal by establishing a
"gross negligence" standard for determining whether target boards'
defensive actions are adequately "informed" for the purpose of satis-
fying the "reasonable belief" prong of the Unocal test.97 The Moran
court held that the Household Board's investigative efforts were suffi-
cient to warrant a finding that it was not grossly negligent. 9 These
efforts consisted of: (i) examining a summary of the pill, (ii) reading
articles about the current takeover environment, (iii) engaging in an
"extended discussion" of the pill with Household's counsel and in-
vestment bankers, and (iv) listening to contrary views.99 While target
94. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350. The court actually applied Unocals enhanced business judg-
ment rule. Accordingly, Unocal is applicable to defensive actions regardless of whether such
action is taken in response to an actual takeover bid.
95. It is also interesting to note that the Moran court premised both its finding of "reasona-
ble belief" and its finding of "rational relationship" on the fact that Household's directors
adopted the pill in reaction to a perceived threat of "bust-up" takeovers in general, and coer-
cive, two-tiered tender offers in particular. Id. at 1356-57.
96. Id. at 1357. The court applied the enhanced business judgment rule after concluding
that the adoption of the pill was within the authority of the Household Board under Delaware
law. Id. at 1355-56. In reaching that conclusion, the court rejected the appellants' contentions
that: (i) no provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law authorized the issuance of the
pill, (ii) the pill improperly usurped stockholders' rights to receive hostile tender offers, and (iii)
the pill restricted stockholders' rights to conduct a proxy contest. Id. at 1351-55; see also TW
Servs., Inc. v. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at
92,182 (Del. Ch. 1989) ("This court has understood [Moran] to mean that a decision not to
redeem a pill in the face of a hostile tender offer is a defensive step that has to be 'reasonable in
relation to the threat posed' by such offer.").
97. Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); see also Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). The court concluded that the Household Board was not
grossly negligent in failing to obtain adequate information relative to the decision to implement
the pill. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356. The court also found that the "good faith" portion of the
first prong of the Unocal test was satisfied because the plaintiffs had failed to allege bad faith.
Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Plaintiff Moran was a Household director and Chairman of appellant Dyson-Kis-
sner-Moran Corp. (D-K-M). Before implementation of the pill, Moran had commenced discus-
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boards may be tempted to view Moran's approval of Household's
rather perfunctory investigation as a "safe harbor," they should be
cautioned that different circumstances will undoubtedly require differ-
ent levels of investigation. l1o
2. The Board's Timeless Right to Defend Against Infamous
Raiders and Coercive, Two-tiered Tender Offers: Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp.
In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,10' the court pre-
served the right of directors to defend the corporation against coer-
cive, two-tiered tender offers made by corporate raiders such as T.
Boone Pickens, regardless of the timing of the offer or the nature of
the defensive action. There, Pickens' Ivanhoe mounted a hostile, two-
tiered bid for Newmont Mining, one of the largest gold producers in
North America. 10 2 In response, the Newmont Board commenced an
aggressive capital program and encouraged its largest shareholder,
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC, to refrain from terminating a pre-ex-
isting standstill agreement. 0 3 Ivanhoe responded by raising its offer
from $95 to $105 per share.' °4 Newmont's Board rejected the in-
creased offer as inadequate and implemented a restructuring plan de-
signed to prevent Ivanhoe from consummating its bid.0 5 The plan
sions with the Household Board concerning a possible leveraged buyout of Household by D-K-
M. Id. at 1349. These discussions represented the "contrary views" that the Board permitted to
be expressed.
100. The Moran court's willingness to accept such a cursory investigation may be explained
by the fact that the Board was not faced with a pending hostile bid when it was deciding whether
to implement the pill.
101. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
102. Id. at 1336-39. The first tier of Ivanhoe's bid was a cash offer for 42% of Newmont
stock at $95 per share, subject to obtaining financing. The second tier was a mere nonbinding
intention to acquire the remaining shares in a second step transaction for $95 per share cash. Id.
at 1339. Ivanhoe's refusal to commit itself to execute the second step rendered the offer coercive
because shareholders would be induced to tender their shares to Ivanhoe in the first phase for
fear of losing the opportunity to tender at $95 if Ivanhoe did not consummate the second step.
Id.
103. Id. In 1981, Gold Fields entered into a 10-year standstill agreement with Newmont in
which it agreed not to acquire more than one-third of Newmont's outstanding stock and agreed
to make certain other concessions to Newmont's Board. The agreement was terminable at the
option of Gold Fields upon acquisition by a third party of 9.9% of Newmont stock. When
Ivanhoe purchased more than 9.9% of Newmont stock, Gold Fields' option to terminate the
standstill agreement was triggered. Id. at 1338.
The capital program, referred to as "the Gold Plan," called for the acceleration of gold ex-
ploration and production. It was designed to boost the value of Newmont's stock. Id. at 1339
n.11.
104. Id. at 1339.
105. Id.
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consisted of the declaration of a $33 per share dividend'06 and the exe-
cution of a new standstill agreement with Gold Fields that allowed
Gold Fields to acquire up to 49.9% of Newmont's stock via a "street
sweep."10 7
Ivanhoe brought suit in the Delaware Chancery Court to enjoin the
dividend and Gold Field's acquisition of additional Newmont stock.10 8
The chancery court issued a temporary restraining order based upon
its preliminary finding that the standstill agreement had entrenching
effects because: (i) Gold Fields was not permitted to transfer its shares
unless the transferee agreed to be bound by the standstill, and (ii)
Gold Fields was required to vote for the Newmont Board's nomi-
nees."' 9 To satisfy the court, Gold Fields and Newmont amended the
standstill to permit Gold Fields to tender its shares into an "any-or-
all" tender offer if the offeror had firm financing and to provide for
the establishment of cumulative voting." 0 The court ruled that these
amendments cured the entrenchment problem and denied Ivanhoe's
motion for preliminary injunction. 1 ' Ivanhoe then appealed to the
Delaware Supreme Court."2
The supreme court appeared to use Ivanhoe as an opportunity to
rearrange the components of the Unocal enhanced business judgment
rule. 1" 3 In Unocal, the court had structured the rule by setting forth a
two-pronged "threshold examination" requiring the directors' to
show: (i) a reasonable belief that the offer posed a danger to corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness, and (ii) that the board's response was
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.1 4 After the threshold exam-
ination was satisfied, the court applied the business judgment rule,
which protects the board unless "the directors' decisions were primar-
ily based on perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach
106. Id. at 1340. The dividend was financed by the sale of Newmont's non-gold assets.
107. Id. at 1339-40. Although the new standstill agreement permitted Gold Fields to acquire
up to 49.9% of Newmont stock, it limited Gold Fields' representation on Newmont's Board to
40% and required Gold Fields to vote for the Board's nominees. In addition, Gold Fields could
not transfer its interest to any third party unless the transferee agreed to be bound by the stand-
still. The $33 per share dividend received by Gold Fields facilitated its purchase of additional
Newmont stock, which was effectuated via a "street sweep." Id. A "street sweep" is the rapid
purchase of securities on the open market during and immediately after a tender offer. Id. at
1337 n.3.
108. Id. at 1340.
109. Id.; Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. Civ. A. 9281, 1987 WL 17677
(Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 1987).
110. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1340.
111. Id.; Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 610 (Del. Ch. 1987).
112. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1336.
113. See supra note 89.
114. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
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of fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or
being uninformed."115
In Ivanhoe, Justice Moore appeared to change the original "two-
tiered threshold examination plus traditional business judgment rule"
structure into a straightforward, tripartite test:
[T]he directors [have] the burden of proving that they have not acted
solely or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office,
that the threatened takeover posed a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness, and that the defensive measures adopted are
reasonable in relation to the threat posed." 6
The board "must satisfy these prerequisites by showing good faith
and reasonable investigation before enjoying the presumptions af-
forded by the business judgement rule.""17 Interestingly though, after
having appeared to restructure the rule, the court's analysis seems to
have lapsed back into the "threshold examination plus business judg-
ment rule" approach expounded in Unocal.""
The court in Ivanhoe added the bidder's modus operandi to the
long list of considerations that directors may contemplate in determin-
ing whether the hostile bid presents a threat to the corporation."19 The
court found that the Newmont Board properly took into account the
fact that corporate raider T. Boone Pickens controlled Ivanhoe and
that Mr. Pickens had previously engaged in numerous attempts to ac-
quire and break up other companies. 20 Moreover, the court recog-
nized the coercive nature of two-tier partial tender offers and found
that such coercive devices were part of "Mr. Pickens' typical modus
115. Id. at 958.
116. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1341.
117. Id. Justice Moore's restructuring of the enhanced business judgment rule may have
come about because of a realization that the original articulation of the rule in Unocal was
structurally flawed because of its "duplicate prongs." See supra note 89. It is interesting to note
that a showing of "good faith and reasonable investigation" was previously a method for the
board to establish "reasonable belief"; it was not applied to the "reasonable relationship"
prong of the "threshold inquiry." In Ivanhoe, the court held that the directors must show
"good faith and reasonable investigation" in order to establish all three components of the re-
constituted enhanced business judgment rule. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1341; Unocal, 493
A.2d at 954-55, 958; see also supra note 89.
118. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345.
119. Id. at 1342. The Unocal court had previously held that the board may consider the
interests of "short term speculators, whose actions may have fueled the coercive aspect of the
offer at the expense of the long term investor." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
120. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1342. The court noted that Mr. Pickens' prior acquisi-
tion attempts had resulted either in the payment of "greenmail" or in extensive restructuring of
the target. Id.; see, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956-57; Mesa Partners v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
488 A.2d 107 (Del. Ch. 1984).
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operandi."'121 Given Mr. Pickens' history, the coercive nature of the
offer, and the finding of inadequate value, the court concluded that
the Newmont Board reasonably believed that Ivanhoe posed a threat
to corporate policy and effectiveness.'2
The court held that the Newmont Board's defensive actions were
reasonable in relation to the threats posed and that the board acted
not to entrench itself, but rather to maintain the company's independ-
ence.'2 Indeed, given the circumstances presented in Ivanhoe, the
Newmont Board "had both the duty and responsibility to oppose the
threats presented by Ivanhoe and Gold Fields."124
The Ivanhoe court gave the Newmont Board virtual carte blanche
to defend against an inadequate, coercive, two-tiered tender offer ini-
tiated by a reputed corporate break-up specialist. Accordingly, Ivan-
hoe demonstrates the inverse relationship between the level of threat
posed by the hostile offer and the relevance of the timing of the chal-
lenged board action. When a hostile bid poses a threat of the magni-
tude presented by corporate greenmallers bearing two-tiered offers,
the board will have a virtually unbridled right to defend the corpora-
tion against it. This right is "timeless"; i.e., the timing of the defen-
sive action is essentially irrelevant.
3. An Example of Bad Timing by the Board: AC Acquisitions
Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.
In AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,12s the Dela-
ware Chancery Court demonstrated the importance of timing as a de-
terminative factor in its decision to strike down a target board's
defensive action. There, AC Acquisitions Corp. (AC) initiated a
tender offer for "any and all shares" of Anderson, Clayton at $56 per
share. 26 The day after the offer was announced, Anderson, Clayton
commenced a self-tender for 65% of its outstanding shares at $60 per
121. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1342; see also Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346,
1357 n.14 (Del. 1985); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
122. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1342. The court also ruled that the Board reasonably
believed that Gold Fields posed a threat to the corporation because it had the right to terminate
the original standstill agreement and acquire control of Newmont. Id. The court's analysis ac-
knowledged that Gold Fields might have acquired control of the company after consummation
of the first step of the Ivanhoe bid, "thus leaving the remaining shareholders without protection
on the 'back end.'" Id.
123. Id. at 1344.
124. Id. at 1345. For an interesting discussion of Ivanhoe, see Towers, supra note 86.
125. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
126. Id. at 104. AC intended to do a follow-up merger at $56 per share after it had acquired
51% of Anderson, Clayton stock. Id.
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share. 27 Anderson, Clayton also intended to sell 25% of its issued and
outstanding stock to a newly formed Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP).' 8 AC immediately brought suit to enjoin the self-tender and
the sale of the stock to the ESOP. 129
Although Chancellor Allen found that the board satisfied the first
prong of the Unocal test, 30 he was unable to conclude that the
board's action was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed.' 3'
The "threat" posed by AC's offer, the Chancellor observed, was:
only in a special sense and on the assumption that a majority of the
Company's shareholders might prefer an alternative to the [AC]
offer. On this assumption, it is reasonable to create an option that
would permit shareholders to keep an equity interest in the firm, but,
in my opinion, it is not reasonable in relation to such a "threat" to
structure such an option so as to preclude as a practical matter
shareholders from accepting the [AC] offer .... [The self-tender]
will have that effect. 32
Given that the board's action (i) failed the Unocal test, (ii) had an
entrenchment effect, and (iii) could not be justified as reasonable, the
Chancellor concluded that the self-tender could not stand in its cur-
rent form. 33
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 105.
130. Id. at 112. The Chancellor observed that the self-tender "may seem not to satisfy" the
reasonable belief requirement because there was no evidence that AC's tender offer threatened
injury to the corporation or its shareholders. Id. Accordingly, Chancellor Allen completely re-
characterized the "reasonable belief" prong of the enhanced business judgment rule by inter-
preting it "to be simply a particularization of the more general requirement that a corporate
purpose, not one personal to the directors, must be served by the stock repurchase." Id. The
Chancellor's conclusion that the first leg of the Unocal test was satisfied was based upon a
finding of a valid corporate purpose, not based upon a finding that the board had a reasonable
belief that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed. Id.
131. Id. at 113.
132. Id. The Chancellor found that the self-tender was coercive in that it effectively pre-
cluded shareholders from choosing the AC offer-no shareholder could risk being frozen out of
the-front end of the self-tender in the event that the AC offer failed to close because of the
nonoccurrence of certain conditions precedent, such as the Board's abandonment of the self-
tender. Id. at 109, 114; see also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F.
Supp. 984, 1015 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (target board may not preclude shareholder choice solely on
the basis of its own perception of inadequacy of the offer).
133. Anderson, Clayton, 519 A.2d at 114-15. The Chancellor ruled that because the Unocal
test was not met, the Board could not avail itself of the protections of the business judgment
rule. Id. at 114. The Chancellor then explained that where board action does not have the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule, it can only be upheld if the transaction is objectively or
intrinsically fair. Id. at 115; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1265 (Del. 1988); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Shamrock Holdings
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"The problem and its solution," the Chancellor observed, "is one
of timing.' ' 34 The court suggested that the Anderson, Clayton Board
could meet the "reasonable relationship" prong of Unocal by giving
shareholders the option to tender their shares to the corporation if a
majority did not tender into the AC offer.135 In other words, the self-
tender could be commenced after the shareholders have had an oppor-
tunity to decide whether or not to tender into the AC offer, rather
than commencing it at the same time and effectively forcing share-
holders to choose the self-tender. 3 6 The court explained that if the
timing of the board action were modified in this way, it would be a
reasonable defensive step in that: (i) it would make the change in con-
trol threatened by the AC offer less likely; (ii) it would give sharehold-
ers an alternative that, due to the noncoercive nature of the AC offer,
would be readily available to shareholders if a majority of sharehold-
ers in fact were to prefer it; and (iii) it would not impair shareholders'
ability to effectively elect the AC option if a majority of shareholders
in fact preferred that option. 37
Anderson, Clayton illustrates the Delaware judiciary's distaste for
coercive tender offers regardless of whether the offer is generated by a
hostile suitor or by the target itself. Anderson, Clayton also shows
how the timing of board action relative to the timing of the hostile bid
can be the determinative factor in the decision to sustain or enjoin the
challenged action. Chancellor Allen's prescient observation that
"[t]he problem and its solution is one of timing' 13  highlights the
v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 271 (Del. Ch. 1989). "Similarly here, where the entrenchment
effect of the [self-tender] creates a species of director interest even on the part of outside direc-
tors, the failure to qualify for the protections of the business judgment rule means that all as-
pects of the transaction must be deemed fair to shareholders ... to be sustained." Anderson,
Clayton, 519 A.2d at 115.
134. Id. at 114.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Chancellor left the door open for Anderson, Clayton to offer an alternative to
the AC transaction by permitting it to participate in the framing of an injunction order that
would eliminate the coercive aspects of the self-tender but would preserve it as an option by
modifying the timing as suggested by the court. Id. at 116.
137. Id. at 114. See also Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988),
where the chancery court struck down a similar coercive self-tender by a target company's
board. The court found the self-tender in Evans to be even more egregious than that in Ander-
son, Clayton because it was economically inferior to the hostile bid. Id. at 1244. The Evans court
was also influenced by the Board's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of the offer and
its proponent. Id. at 1240.
Evans was the first reported decision involving the battle over control of publishing giant
Macmillan, Inc. and is referred to as Macmillan L Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988), cited throughout this Article and discussed supra note 63 is referred to as
Macmillan I. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1265; Prentice & Langmore, supra note
85, at 404-05 & nn.137-38.
138. Anderson, Clayton, 519 A.2d at 114.
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emerging importance of timing as a consideration in the development
and application of the enhanced business judgment rule.
4. The Pills Exceed Their Time: City Capital Associates v.
Interco, Inc. and Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co.
In City Capital Associates v. Interco, Inc. ,1 9 Interco's Board
adopted a prophylactic poison pill similar to that which was employed
in Moran.14 Less than three weeks later, the Rales brothers an-
nounced an offer to acquire Interco by a merger for $64 per share
cash; the offer was ultimately increased to $74 per share. 141 The Board
rejected the offer and adopted a restructuring plan allegedly worth up
to $76 per share to be financed by the sale of the company's Ethan
Allen furniture division and by $2.025 billion in new debt. 42 The
Rales brothers requested the court to order the board to redeem the
pill and to enjoin the restructuring transaction.1 4'
Chancellor Allen took advantage of the opportunity to hail Unocal
as "the most innovative and promising case in our recent corporation
law" and to provide an instructive explanation of its principles.'" Re-
ferring to the Unocal test as "a new intermediate form of judicial re-
view" that had been dubbed "the proportionality test,' ' 45 the
Chancellor admonished that the test must be applied cautiously in or-
der to reduce the danger that courts "will too readily seek to assert the
primacy of their own view on a question upon which reasonable, com-
pletely disinterested minds might differ."'"6 The Chancellor explained
that the threat posed by a tender offer for all shares would not be to
corporate policy or effectiveness, but rather to shareholder interests. 47
139. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
140. Id. at 791. The stock rights plan contained "flip-in" and "flip-over" provisions provid-
ing that: (i) if a shareholder acquired 30% or more of Interco stock, rights holders would have
the right to purchase Interco stock having a market value of twice the exercise price of each
right, and (ii) in the event of a merger or acquisition of 50% or more of the company's assets,
the rights could be exercised to acquire common stock of the acquiring company having twice
the exercise price of the right. Id. at 791-92. The rights plan was adopted because of the Board's
perception that Interco was vulnerable to a "bust-up" takeover.
141. Id. at 792-94.
142. Id. at 793. The restructuring was designed and valued by Interco's investment banker,
Wasserstein Perella, which, the court noted, "has a rather straightforward and conventional
conflict of interest" because it would have received substantial contingency pay if the restructur-
ing was successfully completed. Id. The Ethan Allen furniture division was said to be Interco's
"crown jewel." Id. at 794.
143. Id. at 795.
144. Id at 796.
145. Id.; see Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for De-
fensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247 (1989).
146. Interco, 551 A.2d at 796.
147. Id. at 797.
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These threats are of two types: (i) "threats to voluntariness," in that a
shareholder may be forced to accept an offer because of its coercive-
ness; 14 and (ii) "threats from inadequate but noncoercive offers," in
which the offering price may be inadequate or unfair.' 49
In the latter case, courts have held that a board is not required to
redeem a poison pill rights plan simply because of the existence of a
noncoercive offer. 50 The board is justified in leaving the poison pill in
place while it decides what action to take "to protect and advance
shareholder interests," whether the action consists of negotiating an
increase in the offer, instituting a Revlon-style auction, or developing
an alternative "value-maximizing" transaction.' 51 However, "there
may come a time when a board's fiduciary duty will require it to re-
deem the [pill] and to permit the shareholders to choose" between the
hostile offer and the board's alternative action.' 52 That time comes
148. Id.; see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The Chancellor also noted that "a different form of threat relating to the
voluntariness of the shareholder's choice would arise in a structurally noncoercive offer that
contained false or misleading material information." Interco, 551 A.2d at 797 n.10; see also
Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1015 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
149. Interco, 551 A.2d at 797. As the Chancellor further explained:
Even where an offer is noncoercive, it may represent a "threat" to shareholder
interests in the special sense that an active negotiator with power, in effect, to refuse
the proposal may be able to extract a higher or otherwise more valuable proposal, or
may be able to arrange an alternative transaction or a modified business plan that will
present a more valuable option to shareholders.
Id. at 797-98; see, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch.
1988); CFRT v. Federated Dep't Stores, 633 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
150. Interco, 551 A.2d at 797; see, e.g., Facet Enters. v. Prospect Group, No. 88-9746, 1988
WL 36140 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988); Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., No. 88-10173,
1988 WL 96192 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988); Doskocil Co. v. Griggy, No. 88-10095, 1988 WL
105751 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988).
151. Interco, 551 A.2d at 798. Cf. TW Servs. v. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,181 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). In TW Services, the
chancery court held that in the few circumstances where it had ordered a board to redeem a pill
(referring to Interco and Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988)),
"it was thought that the central purpose of a pill-to give a board time to negotiate on share-
holders' behalf or to consider alternatives to a tender offer ... that threatened to coerce or
otherwise injure shareholders-had been fully served." Id. The court distinguished Interco and
Pillsbury on the grounds that they "did not involve circumstances in which a board had in good
faith ... elected to continue managing the enterprise in a long term mode and not to actively
consider an extraordinary transaction of any type." Id.
152. Interco, 551 A.2d at 798; see also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.,
708 F. Supp 984, 1015 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (If no threat other than inadequacy of the offer exists,
"a board must at some point allow shareholders to choose between the offer and some alterna-
tive."); TW Servs., Inc. v. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII)
94,334, at 92,182 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) ("A decision not to redeem a pi in the face of a
hostile tender offer is a defensive step that has to be 'reasonable in relation ... to the threat
posed' by such offer.").
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when it is apparent that the board does not intend to negotiate an
increase in the offer or institute an auction and when it has had suffi-
cient time to arrange an alternative transaction. 153 "The only function
then left for the pill at this end-stage is to preclude the shareholders
from exercising a judgment about their own interests that differs from
the judgment of the directors .... " 154 Applying these principles to
the facts, the Chancellor concluded that the time had come for the
board to redeem the pill and to permit the shareholders to choose be-
tween the plaintiff's bid and the board's restructuring transaction . 55
It is ironic that even though Chancellor Allen expressly warned
against applying Unocal to permit courts "to assert the primacy of
their own view," that is exactly what the Paramount court accused
Chancellor Allen of doing with respect to his decision in Interco.156 In
rejecting Paramount's attempt to use Interco as support for its claim
that an all-cash, all-shares offer could not pose a threat, the supreme
court declared:
We disapprove of such a narrow and rigid construction of
Unocal .... Plaintiffs' position represents a fundamental
misconception of our standard of review under Unocal principally
because it would involve the court in substituting its judgment as to
what is a "better" deal for that of a corporation's board of
directors. To the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done
so in certain of its opinions, we hereby reject such approach as not in
keeping with a proper Unocal analysis. See, e.g., Interco, 551 A.2d
787, and its progeny .... 157
153. Interco, 551 A.2d at 798.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 800. The Chancellor refused, however, to enjoin the Board from implementing
the restructuring transaction. Id. at 801. The court declared that a hostile bidder "has no right to
demand that its chosen target remain in status quo while its offer is formulated, gradually in-
creased and, perhaps, accepted." Id.
156. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990).
157. Id. at 1153; see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at 2113-14. It is interesting to
note that in his own Paramount opinion, Chancellor Allen had attempted to preserve Interco by
distinguishing it from the Paramount facts. As Chancellor Allen observed:
[In Interco], the board sought to assure continued control by compelling a transaction
that itself would have involved the sale of substantial assets, an enormous increase in
debt and a large cash distribution to shareholders. In other words .... management
was presenting and seeking to "cram down" a transaction that was the functional
equivalent of the very leveraged "bust up" transaction that management was claiming
presented a threat to the corporation.
Here, in sharp contrast, the revised transaction, even though "reactive" in impor-
tant respects, has its origin and central purpose in bonafide strategic business plan-
ning, and not in questions of corporate control.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,283 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); see also
Prentice & Langmore, supra note 85, at 410.
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It is unclear exactly why the supreme court felt that Chancellor Al-
len had "substituted his judgment for that of the board" and to what
extent the court's criticism invalidates the Interco decision. Neverthe-
less, the Chancellor's ruling that the Interco pill had exceeded its time
provides another example of how the timing of a board's action, or in
this case, its refusal to act, was becoming a substantial factor in pre-
Paramount hostile takeover decisions.
In Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 158 the court of chan-
cery ordered Pillsbury's Board to redeem a poison pill in circum-
stances similar to those presented in Interco.159 In 1986 Pillsbury's
Board had adopted a stockholder's rights plan and other defensive
mechanisms to protect Pillsbury from potential hostile suitors. 1(' In
late 1988, Grand Metropolitan launched an all-cash tender offer for
all Pillsbury stock at $63 per share (approximately 60% more than the
NYSE closing price), conditioned upon, inter alia, the Board's re-
demption of Pillsbury's poison pill.161 Not surprisingly, the Pillsbury
Board rejected the offer as inadequate and declined to redeem the
pill.1 62 Grand Metropolitan then sought an injunction ordering the
Pillsbury Board to redeem the pill on the grounds that it precluded
Pillsbury shareholders from choosing whether to accept Grand Met's
offer.'63
The Pillsbury court began its analysis by restructuring the enhanced
business judgment rule into a five-part test. Under this restructured
test, the board must first establish that it had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.
Second, the board must show that it acted in good faith in considering
the tender offer. Third, the board must show that it made a reasona-
ble investigation of the tender offer. Fourth, the board must have
consisted of a majority of outside, independent directors in order for
the proof of the above requirements to be "materially enhanced." Fi-
158. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
159. Id. at 1060.
160. Id. at 1051. The rights plan provided for each common share to receive a preferred
stock purchase right that was exercisable 10 days after a person or group acquired ownership of
at least 20% of Pillsbury's common stock or commenced a tender offer. Each right entitled the
holder to purchase $200 worth of Pillsbury stock for $100. The Board retained the power to
redeem the rights for one cent each. Id. at 1051 n.2. The Board also implemented other defensive
devices such as staggered directorships, a prohibition against shareholder action by written con-
sent, a limitation on who may call shareholders' meetings, and a "supermajority/fair price"
amendment to the corporate charter requiring 800o of the outstanding voting stock to authorize
any "business combination transaction" not approved by the Board. Id. at 1051.
161. Id. at 1052.
162. Id. During the fiscal year ending May 31, 1988, Pillsbury stock ranged in price from $28
to approximately $48. Id.
163. Id. at 1053-54.
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nally, the defensive measure implemented must be reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed.1 4
Although the court found good faith, reasonable investigation and
a majority of independent, outside directors, it concluded that Grand
Metropolitan's offer posed no threat to Pillsbury; the only possible
danger posed was to the shareholders and concerned the adequacy of
the price. 61 Citing Interco, the Pillsbury court granted the requested
relief on the grounds that the Board's decision to keep the pill in place
was not reasonable in relation to any threat posed by the tender offer
and that its sole purpose was to preclude shareholders from choosing
to accept the offer. 66 Noting that the Pillsbury Board's alternative re-
structuring plan would yield shareholders $68 per share in five years,
the court reasoned that a shareholder may decide that $63 in cash
presently was preferable to the possibility of $68 in the future. 6 7 "[A]
stockholder cannot make that choice unless the Rights are re-
deemed." 68
To the extent that Pillsbury is deemed to be among Interco's "prog-
eny," it may be argued that it is no longer good law after Paramount
v. Time. 6 9 However, like Interco, Pillsbury provides us with another
164. Id. at 1056; see also supra note 89; cf. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del.
1985).
165. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1056.
166. Id. at 1060; see also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp.
984, 1013-16 (E.D. Wis. 1989); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798-99 (Del.
1985); TW Servs. v. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,334, at 92,181-82 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
167. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1057.
168. Id. The court concluded that the Pillsbury Board's refusal to redeem the pill was, under
the circumstances, "Draconian." Id. at 1058; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The court's decision was
influenced by the fact that 87% of shares had tendered into the offer and that shareholders
could collectively lose more than $1.5 billion if the Grand Metropolitan offer were withdrawn,
assuming that the stock price fell to its pre-offer level. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1058.
The Pillsbury court also enjoined the Pillsbury Board from proceeding with its alternative plan
to spin-off its subsidiary, Burger King, "at least until this litigation, including all appeals, has
ended. To do otherwise would be to invite chaos for Pillsbury and its shareholders, and possibly
to third parties." Id. at 1061. The Interco court had refused to enjoin the target board's imple-
mentation of its alternative restructuring plan, holding that a hostile bidder "has no right to
demand that its chosen target remain in status quo." Interco, 551 A.2d at 801.
The Pillsbury court conditioned its relief on Grand Metropolitan's waiver of its right to de-
cline to "merge out" nontendering stockholders and on its commitment to offer to buy every
share held by nontendering shareholders at the same price offered to tendering shareholders.
This was intended to eliminate any risk of coercion. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060. Thus, Pillsbury
represents one of the chancery court's most interventionist decisions.
169. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990); see
also supra text accompanying notes 156-57. In Chancellor Allen's Paramount opinion, he sought
to preserve the Pillsbury decision by distinguishing it exactly as he had distinguished Interco. See
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,283 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989); see also supra note 157.
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example of the emerging importance of timing in the pre-Paramount
case law.
5. Timing Becomes Paramount: Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid
Corp.
Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp. 70 confirmed that the timing
of the development of the board's alternative action relative to the
hostile bid was becoming of paramount importance in the determina-
tion of whether the action would be upheld. In that case, Shamrock
Holdings sought to acquire all of Polaroid's stock. 7' In March 1988,
more than three months before Shamrock announced its interest in
Polaroid, Polaroid's Board approved the development of an ESOP, a
plan that Polaroid's management had been contemplating for more
than two years. 172 The board believed that the ESOP would improve
employee productivity and would also provide Polaroid with some
level of antitakeover protection at a time when it was particularly vul-
nerable to a hostile bid. 73
The Board had originally planned to create an ESOP that would
own approximately 5% of Polaroid's issued and outstanding stock.1 74
During the ensuing four months, Polaroid management negotiated
with employee groups concerning the manner in which the ESOP
would be funded. 75 On June 14, 1988, Polaroid's Board approved
and adopted the actual ESOP plan document. 76 On June 17, 1988,
Shamrock informed Polaroid in writing of its interest in the company
and its desire to meet with Polaroid's management. 77 The meeting
was set for July 13 after Shamrock agreed not to acquire any more
Polaroid stock for a reasonable period of time after the meeting. 78 On
July 12, Polaroid informed Shamrock that it was cancelling the meet-
170. 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989).
171. Id. at 259.
172. Id. at 261-63.
173. Id. Polaroid was vulnerable to a takeover bid for several reasons. First, the company's
profits were down. Second, the company had only a modest amount of debt. Finally, Polaroid
had the potential of recovering more than $6 billion from Kodak in a patent infringement suit.
Id. at 261.
174. Id. at 263.
175. Id. At issue were the nature and quantity of benefits that the employees would be will-
ing to give up in order to fund the ESOP. Alternatives considered included a pay cut, pay scale
increase delays, and the use of profit sharing retirement funds. Not surprisingly, the employees
vehemently opposed any pay cut. Id. at 263-64.
176. Id. at 264.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 265.
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ing. Also on that date, the Polaroid Board implemented a modified
ESOP that would own 14% of Polaroid stock. 179
On July 19, Shamrock proposed to acquire Polaroid for $40 per
share cash.180 The next day, Shamrock filed suit seeking to invalidate
the ESOP on the grounds that it was a defensive measure adopted by
a misinformed Board that did not properly apply the analysis required
by Unocal.181 During the pendency of the suit on September 9, 1988,
Shamrock commenced a tender offer for all of Polaroid's outstanding
stock at $42 per share cash, conditioned on a final judicial determina-
tion invalidating the ESOP.182
Undoubtedly determined to rule in favor of Polaroid, Vice-Chan-
cellor Berger chose to apply the more stringent standard suggested by
Shamrock and then to conclude that the ESOP met the standard. As
the court stated:
[N]either a board's failure to become adequately informed nor its
failure to apply a Unocal analysis, where such an approach is
required, will automatically invalidate the corporate transaction.
Under either circumstance, the business judgment rule will not be
applied and the transaction at issue will be scrutinized to determine
whether it is entirely fair.8 3
The court held the ESOP was fundamentally fair even though the in-
creased stock allocation to the ESOP was motivated in part by a de-
sire to obtain its possible antitakeover benefits in the wake of
Shamrock's overture.' 4
179. Id. at 267-68. The Board decided that the 14% ESOP would be funded by a 5% pay
cut, a delay of pay scale increases, 401(k) (retirement plan) matching funds, and a contribution
from the profit sharing plan. Id. at 268.
180. Id. at 269.
181. Id. at 259, 269. Shamrock also sought monetary damages for breach of certain promises
that Polaroid allegedly made to Shamrock in connection with the July 13 meeting. Id. at 259.
182. Id. Shamrock indicated its intention to decrease the offer to $40 if the ESOP was not
invalidated. Id.
183. Id. at 271; see, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1265
(Del. 1989); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 115 (Del. Ch. 1986).
184. Polaroid, 559 A.2d at 275-76. The court noted that the ESOP permitted employees to
choose whether or not to accept a tender offer. The court further observed, however, that em-
ployees were not likely to tender their shares to a hostile bidder for fear of losing their jobs in
the personnel reorganizations that often follow such acquisitions. Accordingly, even though the
existence of the ESOP would make it more difficult for a hostile bidder to acquire all of Pola-
roid's stock, "it cannot be said that management controls the employees' tendering deci-
sions .... The ESOP may mean that a potential acquiror will have to gain the employees'
confidence and support in order to be successful in its takeover effort." Id. at 273-74. The court
also found that the ESOP was likely to increase productivity and earnings and that these benefits
outweighed the minimal decrease in earnings per share and the risk of shareholder dilution. Id.
at 272 n.16, 274.
HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
Although the Polaroid decision is devoid of any reference to the
timing of the original decision to develop an ESOP as a basis for its
decision to uphold the board's action, both the court of chancery and
the supreme court concluded in their Paramount v. Time decisions
that the Polaroid court upheld the ESOP primarily because it had
been planned before the acquisition attempt. 185 Accordingly, Polaroid
is significant because of how the supreme court and the chancery
court subseqaently used it to illustrate the importance of the timing of
the development of board action relative to the hostile bid.
The cases discussed above show how the Delaware judiciary has be-
come increasingly influenced by the timing of board action relative to
the hostile bid in the determination of whether the board's action
passes muster under Unocal. These decisions reveal an increasing
trend toward favoring board actions that were planned before the an-
nouncement of the hostile bid. Consequently, after Polaroid, if a tar-
get board responded to a hostile bid by attempting to facilitate the
completion of an alternative action planned before the announcement
of the bid, the Delaware courts appeared to be inclined to permit the
board to reject the offer and to complete the pre-planned action. 186 In
Paramount v. Time, this trend ripened into a definitive rule of law.
IV. Tim IMPACT OF PARAMOUNT V. Tn f
Paramount v. Time represents the culmination of the Delaware ju-
diciary's five year struggle with the development of the Unocal en-
hanced business judgment rule and its desire to avoid becoming a
"super board of directors."' 8 7 The Paramount court could have easily
set aside the Time Board's pre-planned action in order to permit Time
185. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1990),
aff'g Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,283 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989). Neither the chancery court nor the supreme
court gave a specific page citation to the Polaroid opinion to support their conclusion, nor did
they mention that the 1401o ESOP ultimately adopted was not voted on until after the Board
learned of Shamrock's overture.
186. This pre-Paramount rule should be modified to reflect Interco and Pillsbury's holdings
that where a pre-planned action (such as a poison pill) exceeds its purpose, the chancery court
will require the target board to abandon it. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d
787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988). How-
ever, after Paramount, the viability of Interco and Pillsbury is suspect. See Paramount, 571
A.2d at 1152-53. The rule should also reflect that the Delaware courts' interest in timing will
decrease as the threat posed by the hostile bid increases. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Min-
ing Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (affirming the board's timeless right-and duty-to defend
against coercive, two-tiered offers).
187. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153; see also supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
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shareholders to make a $74 per share profit. 8 s Instead, the court
chose to remain true to its policy of judicial restraint and its recogni-
tion of the importance of timing. The court's refusal to intervene in
such compelling circumstances is a testament to its commitment to the
rules of law expounded in Paramount v. Time. These holdings are
summarized below.
A. A Target Board's Responsive Action Will Be Upheld Where It Is
Intended to Facilitate the Completion of a Transaction Planned
Before the Hostile Bid
The Paramount court's principal reason for upholding the Time
Board's decision to restructure the Time-Warner transaction was that
it "was not aimed at 'cramming down' on its shareholders a manage-
ment-sponsored alternative [to the Paramount bid], but rather had as
its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered
form.' 8 9 The court felt that the restructuring of the transaction was a
reasonable response to the threats posed by the Paramount bid, even
though Time was required to incur "a heavy debt" to finance it.19°
Consequently, the court upheld the Time Board's responsive action
because it facilitated the completion of a transaction that was planned
before the announcement of the Paramount offer. If the Time Board
had not planned or implemented the Time-Warner combination be-
fore the announcement of the Paramount bid, the court may have
reached a different result.
Thus, Paramount v. Time conclusively establishes that "timing is
paramount" in determining whether a board's action will be upheld
when challenged by a hostile suitor. A target board's responsive ac-
tion will be upheld where it is intended to facilitate the completion of
a transaction planned before the announcement of the hostile bid.
B. Directors Have the Power to Determine the Time Frame for
Achievement of Corporate Goals If They Have Developed a
Deliberately Conceived Plan
The Paramount court expounded another important rule of law
concerning the issue of timing. Directors' fiduciary duty to manage
188. On June 7, 1989, the day before Paramount announced its original tender offer of $175
per share, Time stock was trading at $126 per share. Two weeks later, Paramount increased its
offer to $200 per share, thus affording shareholders an opportunity for a $74 per share profit.
Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1147-49.
189. Id. at 1154-55; see also Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch.
1989).
190. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1155. In order to acquire Warner, Time had to incur a stagger-
ing $10.8. billion of debt. Id. at 1146, 1155; see also Duffy, supra note 23, at 82.
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the corporation, the court ruled, "includes the selection of a time
frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be dele-
gated to the stockholders." ' 19' Therefore, the court concluded,
"[d]irectors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived cor-
porate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy."' 92
This holding raises the issue of whether directors have an uncondi-
tional right to choose a long-term corporate strategy over a short-term
one, or whether the court intends to restrict that right to cases in
which the board has adopted and seeks to preserve a "deliberately
conceived plan." If the court intended the right to be unconditional,
then the rule would likely be applied in all hostile takeover cases to
permit target boards to "just say no" to hostile bids without offering
an alternative transaction or without having previously developed a
"deliberately conceived plan."' 193 If, however, the court desired to
191. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del.
1985)). As the supreme court explained earlier in its opinion:
[W]e think it unwise to place undue emphasis upon long-term versus short-term cor-
porate strategy. Two key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware law im-
poses on a board of directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation. This broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate
course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability.
Thus, the question of "long-term" versus "short-term" values is largely irrelevant
because directors, generally, are obliged to chart a course for a corporation which is in
its best interests without regard to a fixed investment horizon. Second, absent a lim-
ited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors, while always
required to act in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.
Id. at 1150 (citations omitted); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at 2108-11 (arguing
that the Paramount court emphasizes directors' duties to the corporate enterprise as opposed to
shareholder interests).
192. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154. The court rejected Paramount's argument that Time
failed the "reasonable relationship" prong of Unocal because shareholders were precluded from
receiving a control premium. The court declared that shareholders do not have an absolute right
to receive a control premium. Whether or not shareholders receive a control premium is within
the discretion of the board. Id.; see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at 2109.
193. Before the supreme court's issuance of its Paramount decision, several commentators
speculated on whether the chancery court's Paramount opinion supported what has been termed
the "just say no" defense, i.e., where a target board seeks to rebuff a hostile bid without pro-
posing an alternative transaction. See, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell, The Paramount Import of Becom-
ing Time-Warner: A Present Value Lesson For Lawyers, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1989, at A14
(Paramount decision supports "just say no" defense); Judith H. Dobrzynski, From One Deci-
sion Flow a Lot of Hard Lessons, Busn;Ess WEEK, July 31, 1989, at 28-29 (quoting investment
banker Roger Altman as opining that Paramount did not affirm the "just say no" defense).
After the supreme court issued its written opinion, Prentice and Langmore concluded that Para-
mount "seems to clearly establish a right to 'just say no."' See Prentice & Langmore, supra note
85, at 479-80. Cf. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp 984, 1013-
15 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
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limit the right to cases where the board has previously developed a
"deliberately conceived plan," then the rule arguably does not stand
as an independent principle of law, but rather as a rationale for the
court's holding that a target board's responsive action will be upheld
where it is intended to facilitate the completion of an action planned
before the announcement of the hostile bid. 19
If the directors' right to select a time frame for achievement of cor-
porate goals was unconditional, target boards would undoubtedly ar-
gue that this right would always permit them to reject the short-term
opportunity presented by the hostile bid in favor of any legitimate
long-term goal "unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corpo-
rate strategy." 195 This interpretation could seriously erode or even
eliminate the enhanced business judgment rule on the theory that
every hostile bid would pose a "threat" to the target board's right to
choose a time frame and that any responsive action designed to defeat
the bid would be "reasonably related" to the "threat" posed. Thus,
the enhanced business judgment rule would arguably be rendered
meaningless. If the supreme court intended to adversely impact Uno-
cal in this fashion, it undoubtedly would have made its intention crys-
tal clear. Consequently, it is far more likely that the court intended to
limit a target board's right to reject hostile bids on "time frame"
grounds to situations in which the board has developed a "deliber-
ately conceived plan."
Assuming that Paramount stands for the proposition that directors
may choose a time frame for achievement of corporate goals provided
they have developed a "deliberately conceived plan," and that such a
plan may be defended when threatened by a hostile bid, the question
then becomes, what qualifies as a "deliberately conceived plan"? Will
any plan suffice "unless there is clearly no basis to sustain" it?1% Or
will the court articulate a more rigorous standard?
If a plan needed only to pass the "no basis" test, any loosely articu-
lated plan could arguably qualify. On the other hand, a plan must still
be a plan regardless of whether it needs only to pass muster under the
"no basis" standard. Webster's New World Dictionary provides that
"plan refers to any detailed method, formulated beforehand, for do-
ing . . . something."' 197 Accordingly, the requirement that there be a
"deliberately conceived plan" presumably envisions the formulation
of a detailed method for achieving a specific corporate goal.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 189-91.
195. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154.
196. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 191-92.
197. WEBSTER's NEw WoRLD DICTIONARY 1088 (Prentice Hall 2d ed. 1986).
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Time's deliberately conceived plan was the Time-Warner combina-
tion that allowed it to gain a foothold in the video production busi-
ness while, at the same time, preserving the "Time Culture" and its
ability to control its own destiny. 98 While an ill-defined "plan" to
preserve the "Time Culture" alone would probably not have sufficed,
Time's intention to enter the video production business via a well
thought-out combination with Warner obviously qualified.199 Accord-
ingly, in order to assert the "time frame" defense to support its deci-
sion to "just say no" to a hostile bid, a target board must have
formulated an actual plan to achieve a legitimate corporate goal be-
fore the announcement of the hostile bid.200
It is important to remember that the Paramount court held that di-
rectors not only have a right to select a time frame for achievement of
corporate goals, but they also have a duty to do so-a duty that may
not be delegated to the stockholders.201 In light of this holding, it was
not only appropriate for the Time Board to cancel the shareholder
vote and restructure the Time-Warner transaction as an outright ac-
quisition in order to effectuate the planned combination, but it would
have arguably been improper for the board to permit a shareholder
vote on the issue.
While some may criticize the court for embracing director supremacy
over shareholder democracy,2  the supreme court's view of corporate
198. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1143 & n.4; see also supra text accompanying notes 3-8.
199. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1148-49. Time spent two years formulating the plan to
combine with Warner. See id. at 1144-45; see also supra text accompanying notes 3-13.
Cf. In re Desoto, Inc. Shareholder Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,964, at 95,392 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990).
200. The most common form of a plan to achieve a corporate goal would be a transaction
planned before the announcement of the hostile bid. See supra text accompanying notes 189-91.
The Delaware courts have yet to address the issue of whether the formulation of a "deliberately
conceived plan" that does not involve some form of a transactional alternative to the hostile bid
would be sufficient.
If a target board seeks to protect its "plan" from being pre-empted by a hostile takeover, the
plan should be designed so that its implementation would render it economically unfeasible for a
hostile suitor to consummate a tender offer.
201. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154.
202. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at 2108-09 (criticizing the court for failing
to articulate a standard by which to measure whether the board is acting in the best interests of
the corporation in rejecting short-term profit maximization); see also Amanda Acquisition Corp.
v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1014-15 (E.D. Wis. 1989), where the district court
ruled as follows:
Applying the Unocal standards, I am unable to conclude that a board may in all
instances preclude shareholder choice solely on the basis of its own perception of the
inadequacy of the offer. If no other threat is posed to the corporation and sharehold-
ers, a board must at some point allow shareholders to choose between the offer and
some alternative.... To do otherwise is to disenfranchise the shareholders.
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governance is the more pragmatic and logical approach." Given that
most publicly-held corporations have many thousands of shareholders
and are affected by a multitude of highly complex economic, financial,
political, and technological factors, the better approach is to empower a
centralized and informed board of directors to manage the corporate
enterprise rather than permit that power to be exercised by "a fluid ag-
gregation of unaffiliated shareholders. " As the Paramount court
ruled, the directors' power to manage the corporation includes the
power to select a time frame for the achievement of corporate goals if
the board has developed a deliberately conceived plan before the an-
nouncement of the hostile bid. If the shareholders are unhappy with
their directors' decisions, they are not without a remedy-they always
possess the ultimate power to vote the directors out of office.
5
C. All-Cash, All-Shares Offers May Pose Threats Other Than
Inadequate Value
The Paramount court examined three chancery court cases dis-
203. See Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,515, at 93,284
(Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) ("The corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in
exercising their power to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of
shares."); see also TW Servs., Inc. v. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,180 n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). In TWServices, Chancellor Allen
explained the Delaware judiciary's view of corporate governance:
[W]hat is our model of corporate governance? "Shareholder democracy" is an ap-
pealing phrase, and the notion of shareholders as the ultimate voting constituency of
the board has obvious pertinence, but that phrase would not constitute the only ele-
ment in a well articulated model. While corporate democracy is a pertinent concept, a
corporation is not a New England town meeting; directors, not shareholders, have
responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, subject however
to a fiduciary obligation.
Id. For interesting perspectives on corporate governance, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Un-
stable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As A Multi-Player Game, 78 GEo. L.J. 1495 (1989);
Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate
Law, 68 TEx. L. REv. 865 (1990); Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate
Contract, 78 GEo. L.J. 71 (1989).
204. See Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,279.
205. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985). While some
may argue that it is impractical to expect thousands of unaffiliated shareholders of a large,
publicly-held company to vote management-sponsored directors out of office, it is entirely possi-
ble that a coalition of major shareholders who was unhappy with its board's repeated refusal to
consider value-maximizing tender offers could wage a proxy fight to elect new, shareholder-
sensitive directors. It is also important to remember that any shareholder, large or small, may
end his or her participation in the corporate enterprise by selling his or her shares. Presumably,
if enough dissatisfied shareholders sold their shares, the market price of the stock would decline.
Thus, a clear message would be sent to closed-minded boards to be more receptive to fair tender
offers or else face a continued decline in the value of the corporation's shares.
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cussed above-Anderson, Clayton,2°6 Interco,2w and Pillsbury2° 8-and
found that they suggested that an all-cash, all-shares offer does not
pose a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, but rather it poses
a threat to shareholders only to the extent that the price may be inade-
quate.0 The Paramount plaintiffs used these cases to support their
argument that an all-cash, all-shares offer within the range of accepta-
ble values cannot pose any threat to the corporation and its sharehold-
ers.210 In response to this argument, the supreme court ruled:
Implicit in the plaintiffs' argument is the view that a hostile tender
offer can pose only two types of threats: the threat of coercion that
results from a two-tier offer promising unequal treatment for
nontendering shareholders; and the threat of inadequate value from
an all-shares, all-cash offer at a price below what a target board in
good faith deems to be the present value of its shares. Since
Paramount's offer was all-cash, the only conceivable "threat,"
plaintiffs argue, was inadequate value.
... Plaintiffs' position represents a fundamental misconception of
our standard of review under Unocal principally because it would
involve the court in substituting its judgment as to what is a "better"
deal for that of a corporation's board of directors. To the extent that
the Court of Chancery has recently done so in certain of its opinions,
we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper
Unocal analysis. See, e.g., Interco, 551 A.2d 787, and its
progeny .... 2
11
The court explained that the Unocal enhanced business judgment
rule is useful because of "its flexibility in the face of a variety of fact
scenarios" and that it is not intended to lead to a simple mathematical
comparison of the value of the hostile bid with the present value of
the management sponsored alternative.212 "Indeed, in our view," the
court declared, "precepts underlying the business judgment rule mili-
tate against a court's engaging in the process of attempting to appraise
and evaluate the relative merits of a long-term versus a short-term in-
vestment goal for shareholders. 2 1
206. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
207. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
208. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
209. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152; Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1056; Interco, 551 A.2d at 797;
see also Anderson, Clayton, 519 A.2d at 113 (the only threat posed is that shareholders might
prefer an alternative to the hostile bid).
210. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152.
211. Id. at 1152-53.
212. Id. at 1153.
213. Id.
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The court ruled that the Time Board reasonably believed that the
Paramount bid posed three threats in addition to inadequate value.
First, inasmuch as the Paramount offer was made just sixteen days
before the Time shareholders' vote on the Time-Warner merger, a
threat existed that Time shareholders might elect to accept the Para-
mount offer in ignorance or in a mistaken belief of the strategic bene-
fit that the combination with Warner might produce. Second, a threat
existed that the Paramount bid was not a certain offer because it was
conditioned upon termination of the merger agreement, redemption
of the rights plan, receipt of cable TV franchises, and the inapplicabil-
ity of the Delaware antitakeover statute. Third, a threat existed that
the Paramount bid, by virtue of its timing, was designed to upset or
confuse the Time shareholders' vote on the Time-Warner merger. 214
"Given this record evidence," said the court, "we cannot conclude
that the Time Board's decision ... that Paramount's offer posed a
threat to corporate policy and effectiveness was lacking in good faith
or dominated by motives of either entrenchment or self-interest.' '215
It is evident that the target board's perceptions of threats from hos-
tile offers will be given a much greater degree of deference in the post-
Paramount world than they had been given in Anderson, Clayton; In-
terco; and Pillsbury. What is less clear, however, is the extent to
which the Delaware courts will be willing to pass judgment on a
board's finding of "inadequate value" where no other threats are
posed by a particular hostile bid. The Paramount court's declaration
that it would not "appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a long-
term versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders" appears to
suggest that future target boards will also enjoy greater deference with
respect to their findings of inadequate value if such findings are made
in good faith and are based upon reasonable investigation.
Thus, Paramount v. Time has favorably impacted a target board's
ability to defend against all-cash, all-shares offers by recognizing that
214. Id.
215. Id.; see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Stan-
dard For Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247
(1989). Professors Gilson and Kraakman identify three types of threats posed by hostile offers:
(i) opportunity loss... [where] a hostile offer might deprive target shareholders of
the opportunity to select a superior alternative offered by target management;
(ii) structural coercion, or the risk that disparate treatment of non-tendering share-
holders might distort shareholders' tender decisions; and
(iii) substantive coercion ... the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an un-
derpriced offer because they disbelieve management's representations of intrinsic
value.
Id. at 267. Substantive coercion was one of the threats found to be posed by the Paramount
offer.
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such offers can pose threats other than inadequate value. It has also
discouraged hostile suitors by reaffirming the court's commitment to
avoid becoming a "supreme board of directors" that would substitute
its judgment as to what is a better deal for that of the target corpora-
tion's board.
D. Target Boards Should Have a Majority of Outside Independent
Directors
Although it had been well settled before Paramount v. Time that a
corporation should have a majority of outside, independent directors
in order to establish "good faith" and "reasonable investigation, '21 6
the Paramount court reaffirmed this rule. 217 The fact that twelve of
sixteen Time directors were outside and independent helped convince
the court that the Time Board's decisions were based upon reasonable
investigation. 218 Accordingly, Paramount v. Time manifests the con-
tinued importance of maintaining a majority of outside, independent
directors on the board if a target company desires to succeed in de-
fending against prospective hostile takeovers.
E. A Target's Incurrence of "Heavy Debt" to Finance a Pre-
planned, Alternative Transaction is Not Per Se Unreasonable
The supreme court was unmoved by the plaintiffs' allegation that
the Time Board acted improperly because it caused the corporation to
incur too much debt in order to effectuate the acquisition of
Warner. 2 9 In response to this claim, the court summarily stated:
[W]e note that although Time was required, as a result of
Paramount's hostile offer, to incur a heavy debt to finance its
acquisition of Warner, that fact alone does not render the board's
decision unreasonable so long as the directors could reasonably
perceive the debt load not to be so injurious to the corporation as to
jeopardize its well being.? 0
216. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del.
1987); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d
1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1988).
217. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154.
218. Id. The court's conclusion was also supported by the fact that the Board had considered
and rejected Paramount as a potential merger candidate when it was exploring the possibility of
merging with one of a number of entertainment companies. Id.
219. Id. at 1155. Time incurred $10.8 billion in debt to acquire Warner. See Duffy, supra
note 23, at 82; see also Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1148.
220. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1155.
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The court's unwillingness to pass on the merits of the Time Board's
decision to incur close to $11 billion in debt is entirely consistent with
its overall policy of judicial restraint and its reluctance to second guess
board judgment. The economic ills of the nineties may, however,
change the court's view of the incurrence of excessive debt from busi-
ness as usual to a threat of the magnitude presented by coercive, two-
tiered tender offers. "21 If courts come to suspect that unfettered in-
currence of debt was responsible in whole or in part for the painful
economic downturn that the country is suffering at present, board de-
cisions authorizing excessive corporate borrowing will undoubtedly be
subject to greater scrutiny in the future.m2
V. CONCLUSION
Paramount v. Time has impacted the law of hostile takeovers in
five significant ways. First, it confirmed that the "timing of board
action is paramount" by affirming the right of directors to reject a
hostile bid in order to facilitate the completion of a transaction
planned before the announcement of the offer. Second, it established
that directors have the power to choose a time frame for achievement
of corporate goals-and that this power will permit directors to "just
say no" to a hostile bid-provided they have previously developed a
"deliberately conceived plan" to achieve a legitimate corporate goal.
Third, it recognized that all-cash, all-shares offers can pose threats in
addition to inadequate value. Fourth, it reaffirmed that boards should
have a majority of outside, independent directors in order to show
that their decisions are made in good faith and based upon reasonable
investigation. Fifth, it found that the incurrence of a "heavy debt" to
finance a pre-planned, alternative transaction is not per se unreasona-
ble.
These holdings confirm the Supreme Court of Delaware's policy of
judicial restraint and its reluctance to become a "supreme board of
directors" in hostile takeover cases. The fact that these holdings were
rendered in a case in which shareholders could have realized a $74 per
share profit is a testament to the court's determination to resist the
temptation to substitute its judgment as to what is a "better" deal for
221. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Un-
ocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
222. See Duffy, supra note 23, at 82-83. As of the date of the Business Week article, Time
Warner stock was trading at approximately $70 per share. The article argues that Time Warner
stock has not performed better primarily because of the enormous debt burden undertaken to
effectuate the Warner acquisition and investors' uncertainty about Time's ability to reduce it.
See also Prentice & Langmore, supra note 86, at 480-81.
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that of the corporation's board. The Paramount case shows that Uno-
cal's enhanced business judgment rule has developed into an effective
compromise between the corporation's need for power to be exercised
by a knowledgeable and informed board of directors and the share-
holders' need to be protected from the "omnipresent specter" of
board entrenchment in the context of hostile takeovers.
The Delaware Supreme Court's hostile takeover jurisprudence
should not be judged by the results of economic studies on the relative
merits of hostile takeovers. Rather, it should be evaluated on the basis
of its success in preserving the traditional concept of the corporation
as manifested in the legislation that creates and defines corporations.
Paramount v. Time demonstrates that the court has achieved that
goal.

